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FOREWORD
This PKSOI Paper is designed to further the U.S. and
other interested international governments’ understanding
of how Security Sector Reform (SSR) was conducted in
Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. This was America’s first
attempt at conducting formalized SSR, so it offers readers
an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as
key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for
reform, and how well the United States and its partners met
the typical challenges of SSR.
The author rightly points out the synergy that was lost
because of a lack of coordination and understanding between
government officials and nongovernmental organizations
like aid groups, academia, and think tanks. This deficiency
became one of my focal points as I started to build my team
in Afghanistan.
The lessons learned from this endeavor were useful
to me as I developed my strategy for helping the Afghans
make their country a secure and stable state. The author’s
experience revealed many pitfalls in security sector building
and international team-building that we are trying to avoid
today.
Finally, this paper provides a case study to help explain
the SSR concepts that were recently formalized in U.S. Army
Field Manual 3.07, Stability Operations Doctrine. It provides
insights into how the military interacts with host-nation
governments, the United Nations, the State Department,
and national embassies to solve today’s complex problems.

STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL
General, U.S. Army
Commander,
United States Forces-Afghanistan/
International Security Assistance Force,
Afghanistan
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SUMMARY
Security sector reform (SSR) is that set of policies,
plans, programs, and activities that a government
undertakes to improve the way it provides safety,
security, and justice. This is a complex and involved
task against which Captain Howk evaluates the early
international effort to rebuild effective governance
in Afghanistan. The purpose of this case study is to
document the lessons learned through the development
and execution of the SSR program in Afghanistan,
with special emphasis from 2002 through 2003. The
author has a unique and enviable position from which
to observe the inner workings of the highest level
commands in Afghanistan—first as an Aide de Camp
to then Major General Karl Eikenberry during his first
tour in Afghanistan and as the current Aide de Camp
to General Stanley McChrystal.
This paper is not only a case study, but in effect is
a primer on SSR. It critically evaluates the underlying
theories of SSR and discusses how SSR should work
in an operational environment. The paper concludes
by reexamining the development of the strategy and
implementation of the SSR effort in Afghanistan. By
2002 it was clear that SSR was an important focus, and
it was recognized to be essential for the successful
development of economic and governance institutions
in Afghanistan.
The paper uses the four major elements of the
security sector as outlined by D. Hendrickson and A.
Karkoszka to focus on seven key objectives. To narrow
the scope of the paper, the author details the role of
four typical actors involved in SSR: donor nations;
recipient state of Afghanistan; multilateral participants
such as the United Nations (UN), SSR experts, and
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nongovernmental organizations; and regional security
cooperation entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
The paper provides an insider’s view of the preparation accomplished by the leadership team prior to
entering Afghanistan, and then it provides a critical
assessment of the SSR activities that were conducted.
The paper incorporates an assessment by General
Eikenberry in which he assesses the implementation of
the SSR Strategy in 2002-03.
The author concludes with several lessons learned
in communication, staffing, interagency issues, leadership, and implementation, noting several rules of
thumb and best practices.
Captain Howk recommends that SSR be the
single, primary duty for a senior leader so that it
does not decline in scope and emphasis, and that
planners determine the refined mission objectives and
goals for such a position should it be reinstated. He
further recommends that the United States create an
SSR coordinator on the National Security Council to
integrate and synchronize all agencies and departments.
Finally, he recommends that we consider former UN
Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi’s advice that lead
nations remain patient. Afghanistan must be mentored
and given every opportunity to succeed.
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A CASE STUDY IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:
LEARNING FROM SECURITY SECTOR REFORM/
BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN
(OCTOBER 2002-SEPTEMBER 2003)*

All photos courtesy of author.

Figure 1. Afghan Tribesmen at a Buzkashi Match.
Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan is a lot like a
Buzkashi match, lots of motivated people running
around trying to grab the calf, then a ferocious scrum
to determine whom to chase next . . . it seems to have
no end, exhausts all the horses, leaves the riders bruised
and broken, and it’s hard to tell who’s actually winning;
but the players will never forget it.1

INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to answer three questions
about Security Sector Reform (SSR) by studying the

____________
*I am indebted to Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the many members
of the U.S. Security Coordinator’s Staff, the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan, the SSR forum, and the international SSR community who
assisted me in recalling and organizing these lessons before they were
lost to time. All errors are the author’s alone.
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case of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. First, how was
SSR conducted in Afghanistan—what was the forum,
who were the actors, and what was the strategy?
Second, what did SSR mean in Afghanistan—what
institutions were slated for reform, what were the goals,
and how well were nations prepared to achieve them?
Finally, how well did the SSR strategy and team meet
the typical challenges for SSR as outlined by David
Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka? What goals were met,
what issues were avoided or solved, and what lessons
can be gleaned for future use?2
The purpose of this paper is to document the lessons
learned through the development and execution of an
SSR program. Some of the positive findings of this
work should help guide future SSR leaders, while
the explanation of unsuccessful decisions and polices
should prepare future planners for the difficulties of
SSR. This paper is not meant to correct the record or
cast blame on any actors, but rather to describe the
actual facts of the SSR process between 2002 and 2003.
The lessons and history described here are specific to
how SSR was conducted and should be useful to future
leaders called upon to conduct it.
The articles, books, and studies written about
Afghanistan and SSR have pointed out how the Bonn
agreement of 2001 set forth key pillars that would
enhance Afghan sovereignty and development.
They also showed how many of the critical pillars
have needed improvement over the 7 years since the
international intervention in Afghanistan. But the
literature largely fails to describe the actual process of
SSR in Afghanistan, namely, how it developed after
the October 2002 introduction of a SSR coordinator and
what its goals, accomplishments, and shortcomings
were. The primary reason for this omission is twofold:
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authors did not know about or chose not to write
about the monthly SSR meetings that started in the
fall of 2002. These same authors do not reference the
role of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) who was
sent to Afghanistan in October 2002 to develop and
coordinate an Afghan SSR strategy that would enable
the international community to address the concerns
being heard by the U.S. Administration from the Afghan government, the coalition military commanders,
and the international community.3
In hindsight, it was a loss for the Afghan people
and the world that many SSR experts/authors from
numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
international governmental organizations (IGOs),
and think tanks spent so much time assessing and
critiquing the SSR pillars in Afghanistan and yet never
effectively integrated themselves into the Afghanistan
SSR working group to share their expertise and present
their concerns for address. But one of the most critical
oversights was the International SSR working group’s
failure to invite these experts into the formal SSR
process, incorporate their wisdom into the strategic
plan, and give them an official seat at the table each
month to discuss their issues. This omission might be
one of the most important lessons from the SSR process
in Afghanistan.
This paper begins with a discussion of the international understanding of SSR, the U.S. definition of
SSR in Afghanistan, and how SSR’s performance was
envisioned. Next, it will highlight the development
of the SSR strategy, and how that strategy was
implemented, with special attention to the positive
measures and the many areas that could have been
improved. Additionally, it will evaluate the SSR
campaign, relying principally upon an SSR article that
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explains most of what was known about SSR in 2002.
This will show that the SSR strategy was fairly sound,
but that execution was difficult. Finally, it will offer
some lessons learned by the SSR team and some areas
that should be explored in greater detail.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN 2002
By 2002, when the endeavor to rebuild the security
structure in Afghanistan became a major focus for the
coalition, SSR was commonly (but not unanimously)
defined as a long-term enterprise that “aims to improve
governance, thereby reducing the risk of state weakness
or state failure.”4 Moreover, it was believed to have
never been successfully and fully implemented in any
country.5 It was also clear that SSR was directly tied
to successful economic and governance development.
Most nations willing to conduct conflict prevention
and state building missions understood this linkage in
2002.6 Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) discuss the
new reality that such security entities as militias and
private armies bring to situations, and further refine
what the typical security sector includes. Although
private militias may not be legally authorized by a
state, they need to be dealt with in the broader picture
of reforming the other traditional security elements.
For the purposes of this paper, I will use the the four
major elements of the security sector as outlined by
Hendrickson and Karkoszka: (1) armed forces of all
persuasions that are authorized by law to use force on
behalf of the government, (2) the elected and appointed
civilians that are responsible for both the management
of security forces and the oversight of their activities,
(3) the institutions that enforce laws and deliver justice
to the citizens according to official legislation, and (4)
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the nonstatutory security forces such as militias and
private armies.7
Some of the key objectives traditionally focused on
during the SSR process that will be useful in assessing
the Afghanistan case include (1) professionalizing
all the security forces, (2) developing the capacity of
civil servants to “manage and oversee the security
sector,”8 (3) creating an environment that protects
human rights, (4) nurturing a civil society that has the
capability of surveilling the security sector and pressing
for change or giving advice to the civil authorities on
matters related to the security sector, (5) establishing
transparency in security matters so the citizens can
have a basic understanding of the issue, (6) ensuring
that the security sector operates within national and
international legal frameworks, and (7) convincing
regional actors that share the problems of the troubled
nation to support the reforms (see Table 1).9
Professionalize security forces
Develop capacity in the civil servants
Create an environment that protects human rights
Ensure the civil society can observe, press for change,
and give advice about the security sector
Establish transparency in security matters and aid citizens
to gain a basic understanding of them
Ensure the security sector operates within national and
international legal frameworks
Convince regional actors to support the SSR process.

Table 1. Traditional SSR Objectives.
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For this paper, I have chosen to detail the role of
four of the typical actors involved in SSR. First are
the donor nations that choose to take on a role in
SSR. Second is the recipient state itself, in this case
the Afghans. Third are the multilateral players whose
focuses are traditionally towards development; these
can be United Nations (UN) elements, SSR experts, or
NGOs. The fourth element consists of regional security
cooperation entities like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). (See Table 2.) An explanation
of the role of some of the key actors follows.10
Main donor nations/Lead Nations
Recipient State
Multilateral Players
Regional Security Cooperation Establishments

Table 2. Typical Actors within the SSR Process.
The main donor state actors included the USSC,
the Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A), the Commander of Coalition
Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), and the main donor
nation Ambassadors to Afghanistan. The Afghan
government actors included the President and nearly
his entire cabinet. The primary multilateral actor was
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG), who worked closely with the USSC. He was
assisted by numerous UN agency leaders specializing
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in various SSR pillars (see Table 3). Finally, the regional
security cooperation actor was NATO, represented
by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
commander.
Germany

Police Reform

Italy		

Judicial Reform

Japan (UN)

 isarmament, Demobilization, and
D
Reintegration (DDR)

United Kingdom

CounterNarcotics

United States	

 ilitary Reform: Afghan National Army
M
(ANA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Table 3. Five Security Sector Reform Lead Nations
and Pillars Determined by the Bonn Process.
The U.S. SSR Concept and What It Meant for
Afghanistan.11
In the summer of 2002 after 8 months of military
action in Afghanistan, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, wanting a senior military officer
to assess and better coordinate the SSR process in
Afghanistan, selected then-Major General Karl W.
Eikenberry, an officer with Infantry (up to Assistant
Division Commander level) and Foreign Area Officer
experience (up to the one-star level), from the Army
Staff to become the first USSC for Afghanistan.
General Eikenberry was tasked to assemble a team
from the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government,
and international community actors that could better
tackle the SSR process. There was a personal interest on
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the part of the Defense Secretary to create and fill this
position as reflected by his conducting the interviews
for the job himself.12 At this point, the U.S. SSR concept
was far from solidified; in fact, the concept of an SSR
working group within the U.S. Government was not
formalized until about 2004.13 Before he departed for
Afghanistan, an additional portfolio titled Chief of the
Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A)
was added to General Eikenberry’s duty description.
Though the OMC-A billet was being filled at the time
by a U.S. brigadier general, discussion among the Joint
Staff, Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Office
of Secretary of Defense (OSD) had determined that
the USSC should be dual-hatted as the Chief of the
OMC-A.
Although the dire situation on the ground in
Afghanistan after decades of war and civil strife actually
made the term building more adequate than reform, the
Department of Defense (DoD) chose to call the mission
Security Sector Reform (SSR). The devastation of human
capital, infrastructure, and societal institutions above
the tribal structure all added to the herculean task the
United States and the Coalition were undertaking.
The position of USSC was unique and possibly
unprecedented; thus many agencies, departments, and
bureaucrats wanted to have input into the duties and
limits of this job. This was understandable, given the
number of agencies the person would be coordinating
with and the traditional non-DoD agency areas that
the coordinator would be operating in. After several
months, OSD, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, CJTF-180,
the State Department, and the U.S. Embassy Kabul
reached an acceptable understanding for the Terms
of Reference in which the USSC would operate. The
understanding embraced the following initial essential
tasks and objectives.14
8

The primary task for the USSC was to accelerate the
development of a Security Sector Reform working group that
would include the five lead nations, the Afghan government,
and the UN. Additionally he would ensure that all SSR
programs were compatible with and supportive of the Afghan
government’s goals and objectives. A secondary task was
to advise the State and Defense Departments on all matters
involved with the Security Sector Reform process through
the USCENTCOM and U.S. Embassy Kabul.
The major objectives included establishment of the
SSR forum, expansion of the organizational SSR capacities
of lead nation embassies in Kabul (identifying their needs
and coordinating for assistance), facilitating the acceleration
of SSR work in the provinces, and synchronization of the
Afghan National Army (ANA) building program and Afghan
DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically
feasible.15 While no clear criteria for success were given
at this time, it was hoped by OSD and USCENTCOM
that near-term gains would be made by developing a
better understanding of the current state of the Security
Sector on the ground and executing recommendations
on ways to accelerate security from the USSC.16
Preparing for an SSR Mission.
One of the dilemmas in preparing for this mission
was that in 2002 there was no U.S. Government model
or doctrine that detailed the SSR process. In preparation
for the deployment, the USSC relied on four distinct
sources of information:
1. The Bonn frameworks that stipulated how the
Afghan government would function and delineated
which of the G-8 nations would be responsible for each
of the five primary security pillars.
2. The basic military officer problem-solving
method: identify and assess the issues and then create
9

a plan to solve them. This method was used to execute
the plan, assess the execution, and periodically make
changes when necessary.
3. Civilian experts that had been observing that
region of the world for years, including journalists and
authors such as Barnett Rubin, Ahmed Rashid, and
Carlotta Gall, to name a few. These civilians would
have access to the USSC once he arrived in Kabul,
maintaining a continuous dialogue during his tour.
4. Numerous U.S. Government agency updates and
reports on the situation.
When asked how he would describe the initial
planning and execution of the SSR process, General
Eikenberry replied:
Overall it might be termed exploratory learning because
the many uncertainties of the Afghanistan mission
added to the steepness of the learning curve. They
included: (1) Lack of doctrine for nation building on this
level of destruction. (2) Lack of cooperative agreements
among the lead nations as to the scope of their efforts
and willingness to cooperate. (3) The unprecedented
nature of building a security sector in a nation that is
so damaged from 30 years civil war and humanitarian
disaster.17

The Security Coordinator developed four initial
short-term goals to be executed upon arrival in Kabul.
The first goal was to take stock of the situation on the
ground, to include the environment, the infrastructure,
the institutions, and the human capital. The next goal
was to meet with the SSR actors from all sides—military, civilian, Afghan, and Coalition. The third goal
was to establish relationships with necessary players
within the SSR realm and beyond to include all relevant
government officials. The final goal was to identify
10

the key stakeholders in the process and evaluate their
capabilities.
Before he left the United States, General Eikenberry
ran into two additional obstacles as he tried to define
a clear initial strategy for Afghanistan’s SSR project.
First, the key stakeholders (the UN, United States,
European partners, and Afghans) did not have a clear
understanding of the Afghanistan crisis; and second, it
was unclear what resources and expertise each nation
was bringing to the table or what level of commitment
they were willing to give to this project. Literally
building a nation was not a challenge to be taken
lightly. The SSR strategy would remain imprecise
until these two uncertainties were resolved. Until an
assessment was made, the basic strategy would follow
the four main steps outlined in Table 4.
1. Assess and identify the key actors.
2. Establish a mechanism for information sharing and network
building.
3. Go beyond information sharing to coordination of Security
Sector areas.
4. Begin collaboration on tasks so as to create synergy in the
SSR process.
(The underlying theory of this strategy was to build the Afghan
capacity at each stage.)

Table 4. Initial SSR Strategy.
On the Ground in Afghanistan: An Assessment.
After General Eikenberry arrived in Kabul, an
assessment of the initial strategy revealed who the
key actors were, how prepared each element of the
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SSR process was, and how to proceed. The assessment
ended with the selection of the SSR Forum participants
and a newly agreed-upon SSR strategy.
Among the key players most directly involved
in the SSR forum, UN Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi was
chosen to head the forum, working side by side with
General Eikenberry on all SSR issues. His presence
lent credibility, coherence, counsel, and leadership to
the SSR Forum. His years of experience and expertise
in SSR-related matters and ability to strengthen
institutions were critical to motivating other actors
to step forward and take risks to make real change in
Afghanistan. SSR daily operations were managed by
General Eikenberry, the USSC, who determined the
needs of SSR and provided strategic guidance and
advice to all members of the forum through frequent
bilateral and multilateral meetings. He additionally
filled the role of Chief of the Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), which made him
the leader of the organization tasked with building the
ANA and reforming the Afghan Ministry of Defense
and the government agencies providing oversight of
the military.
Beyond the SSR leadership were the five lead
nations’ representatives to Afghanistan: for Germany,
Ambassador Eberle and Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM) Schlaudraff; for the United States, Ambassador
Finn, Special Ambassador Taylor, and later Chargé
d’Affaires David Sedney; for the United Kingdom
(UK), Ambassador Nash; for Japan, Ambassador
Komano and DCM Miyahara; and for Italy, Ambassador
Giorgi. The forum also included numerous defense
attachés, political officers, and security sector project
officers and members. Two other critical members
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of the SSR team from the UN included Mr. Sultan
Aziz from the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA), who was working on DDR
with the Japanese, and Mr. Jean Arnault, the Deputy
to Special Representative Brahimi and a key counsel
to the USSC. Finally, from the Coalition were the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) team
which was normally represented by the Commander
or Deputy Commander and their Political Advisors,
and the Commanders of Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF)-180, Lieutenant Generals Dan McNeill and John
Vines.

Figure 2. SSR Senior Working Group at the British
Embassy Summer 2003.
(Left to Right: German Representative, U.S. Chargé
d’ Affaires Sedney, Afghan NSA Dr. Rassoul,
Japanese Ambassador Komano, UNSRSG Brahimi,
USSC MG Eikenberry, British Ambassador Nash,
Italian Ambassador Giorgi, ISAF Commander LTG
Gliemeroth.)
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The primary Afghan asset on behalf of the SSR
forum was President Karzai, who was crucial to two of
the pillars, the development of the ANA and launching
DDR. The future of each of these pillars depended on
the other; additionally, their success played a critical
political role because the President could not truly
consolidate his administration and secure his citizens
until DDR occurred. Although President Karzai did
not attend the forums, his support of the process was
invaluable because he led the Afghan buy-in into the
concept of SSR. Afghan National Security Advisor
Dr. Rassoul and President Karzai’s Chief of Staff Said
Jawad were the two critical actors who stayed abreast
of SSR issues. Though not in attendance at all forums,
they were always briefed on the latest actions and
helped the SSR team select appropriate Afghan
representatives to attend the SSR forums. Finally,
key actors included the five Afghans who headed
the Security Pillars being reformed. These members
changed over time and did not always attend the
formal SSR Forum, but they were the key interlocutors
with the lead nation SSR experts, usually meeting on at
least a weekly basis to address the reform issues.18
A quick assessment of the current SSR activities
revealed a divergence in preparedness, manpower,
and resources among the countries.
1. While the United States had no organized SSR
effort, its initial strategy for building the ANA and
reforming the MoD was in place and was being swiftly
executed by a very small but resourceful team of
personnel tasked with a massive effort and given few
resources.
2. Japan had good political leadership and linkages
to the UN agencies helping to execute the DDR process
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and had a committed aid package, but was handicapped
by the small size of its staff.
3. Germany had a very narrow training-centric
vision of what its role was going to be in reforming
the police and very few personnel committed to the
endeavor.
4. The UK was inadequately resourced to execute
its counternarcotics role, mainly due to a lack of
manpower.
5. Italy was the least prepared in terms of resources,
vision for success, and personnel committed to the
judicial sector reforms.
Simply put, no country was really ready for the
mission it had signed up for. Only two of the five
lead nations had developed adequate, detailed longterm visions for success—the U.S. team building the
ANA and the Japanese/UN team performing DDR.
The following roadmap (Table 5) is an example of the
type of broad vision for reform that would have been
helpful to the SSR process if possessed by the other lead
nations. This vision provided the kind of focus needed
to sustain the U.S. reform effort for at least a year.
After self-examination, the SSR forum members
realized that the initial overall long-term plan for SSR
in Afghanistan was feasible in the abstract, but that
they lacked resources and would be able to take the
effort only so far based on their current capabilities.
The nations contacted their governments for more
resources to alleviate the limitations. Some states were
more successful than others in changing their vision
for SSR and in gaining the appropriate resources to
execute their plans. The final SSR strategy was created
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Task: The Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A) will plan and direct U.S./Coalition
efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan National Army
(ANA) Central Corps by June 2004 and solicit international
donations for the Afghan Armed Forces.
Major Objectives:
• Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3 Brigades
by 1 Oct 2003
• D
 evelop and begin implementation of Afghan MoD/General
Staff reform plan
• E
 stablish ANA institutional support systems including
officer and NCO schools, ANA training and doctrine
directorate, and garrison support elements
• D
 esign and build OMC-A structure consisting of U.S./
Coalition military, contractor, and Afghan civilian and
military personnel capable of managing the ANA building
program as it increases in scope and complexity
• Increase international and Afghan domestic support for
and confidence in ANA through the maintenance of quality
within the force and the conduct of effective information
operations.

Table 5. U.S. Afghan Army Building and MoD
Reform Plan October 2002.
after assessing the new assets the nations had pledged
towards the mission and acknowledging the lack of
resources that they would have to live with. The final
strategy is outlined in Table 6.
Carrying out SSR.
To explain how the SSR process was executed,
specific events that were conducted to support the
strategy are analyzed. The reader will gain a better idea
16

1. Establish a forum that at first provides a conduit for
information sharing about SSR issues and later becomes a
vehicle for collaboration among the key actors.
2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively
manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest.
3. Build the Afghan government capacity.
4. Develop strategic plans among and agreed upon by all actors
so as to identify and fix problems by leveraging the resources
from their nations or the international community.

Table 6. Final SSR Strategy.
of what is required of a SSR coordinator by looking at
a description of the typical daily, weekly, and monthly
events that the USSC participated in and what areas
consumed most of his time. Finally, a discussion of
some of the surprising and disappointing activities
and issues that the USSC encountered in his duties
will raise awareness of the pitfalls that exist in wartorn regions.
In general, SSR forums were conducted in the
following manner. The host of the meeting was
chosen 1 month prior to the event and was responsible
for developing the program for that meeting and
coordinating and preparing the attendees. The senior
SSR leaders would all be in attendance, along with
selected Afghan representatives associated with that
month’s topic. Additionally, all the staff and special
guests would be present for the discussion. The USSC
would make the opening remarks to refocus the team
and then hand it over to the UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the UN perspective
on events. After the leadership finished the opening
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remarks, each stakeholder would give an update on
his particular area, and the floor would be opened for
specially slated topics. Some of the areas discussed
in the meetings included the introduction of new
military concepts like the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and the role of Afghan actors in various SSR
areas. One of the items often highlighted was the need
for synchronized planning and execution of reforms.
Another key element of the meeting was deciding the
next major step to be taken with members’ Afghan
counterparts. Finally, these meetings allowed for
discussions of recent setbacks to coordinate surging
resources for getting back on track, meeting obstacles
that needed to be overcome, or speeding up the reform
of one sector to relieve pressure on another.
These forums occurred monthly, which seemed to
be the right frequency to allow recognizable progress
to be made and a sufficient number of new problems
to arise that required attention. These monthly
meetings were not the only occasions that SSR team
members met, but they were the only scheduled times
for the entire extended group to gather. Bilateral and
multilateral meetings frequently occurred to follow
up on initial plans or handle emergency issues. The
meetings contributed to the success of all four elements
of the SSR strategy, although it was weakest in helping
to build Afghan government capacity.19
Bilateral and multilateral meetings on SSR subjects
were another key event for the success of the program.
A model for how the security sector reform multilateral
meetings could work was the synchronization between
the Army and Police standing up, on one hand, and the
militias standing down, on the other (see Table 3). This
effort was always synchronized to ensure that the lead
nations developed timelines and plans that balanced
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their demobilization events with security forces
recruiting events. The Japanese, UN, Germans, and
Americans met continuously and came to agreements
about the timing of the militia drawdowns throughout
the year. Because of a lack of resources and an unclear
method for coordinating the acquisition of their
resources, not all lead nations were coordinated in this
manner. The nations did well based on the resources
at hand, but resources were inadequate by all accounts
because of the immense size of the problem. These
events also supported the SSR strategy (Table 6) but
were least successful in fulfilling the fourth element
(developing mutual strategic plans) since getting more
resources from any state was nearly always an issue.
What started as a chance for the USSC to meet with
the Afghan citizens on the street and assess in person
the needs of the people turned into one of the most
useful events for building the Afghan government
capacity. The Afghan National Army recruiting/
awareness trips outside of Kabul to the provinces were
one of the most critical events every week. There were
a few different goals for these trips. Among these goals
were evaluating security forces, spreading awareness
of the Afghan National Army and Police, meeting with
governors, and talking to tribal leaders. The members on
the trips changed weekly, but generally they consisted
of the USSC, various Afghan ministers, Afghan military
personnel, lead nation embassy personnel, at least one
lead nation Ambassador, U.S. personnel involved with
ANA or SSR tasks, UN representatives, and IGO/NGO
representatives.
Another purpose for these trips was to show the
people of Afghanistan that there really was a new
government, and that it was ethnically mixed and
interested in their issues. Still another purpose was to
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explain and display the new security institutions to the
provinces, while promoting ANA or Police recruiting.
Additionally, it gave the Afghan people an opportunity
to put a face with their new national government
leaders’ names. Also, it allowed provincial leaders
to talk shop with the central government, which was
often impossible because of poor communication
and transport. Finally, the trips allowed the Afghan
ministers to see their tasks and responsibilities outside
of Kabul and to let them be seen by their people and
understand that, as national leaders, they now served
all the people of Afghanistan and not just one ethnic
group or region.
General Eikenberry recalled that one of the best
examples of how he knew success had been achieved
through these weekly trips was the locals’ change of
focus from him to the Afghans. He noted that on the
early trips the entire traveling party would follow
him around and observe his interactions. Later,
they followed his lead, yet were still quite unsure of
themselves, mostly talking among themselves and not
really engaging the locals. In still later trips, however,
he often found himself standing alone, except for his
security detail, as the Afghan members were immersed
in crowds of people, interacting with them, answering
questions about their ministries, and giving little
speeches. Once the general saw this new dynamic,
he knew the Afghan officials were developing one of
the requisite skills for leaders in a representative and
accountable state.20
A series of events was launched in March 2003 that
would require the total involvement of the Afghan
government leaders and the international community
in highlighting and working through all the securityrelated issues still simmering in the country. The first
was a trip to the United States for the two primary
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leaders of the Intelligence Service (NDS) and the
two key leaders of the MoD to engage with their
counterparts in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and the Pentagon and to observe the training of cadets,
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), special forces,
infantry soldiers, and officers at numerous American
bases. This visit helped to impress upon the leaders
the level of responsibility they had laid claim to as
Kabul was retaken when the Taliban retreated. It also
underscored the need for them to be responsible actors
on the national stage and support the international
community in its efforts to reform the security sector.
The next such event, a truce, occurred in April
2003 when the Afghan Ministry of Defense and
the Commander of CJTF-180 co-hosted a working
conference for senior military leaders. This meeting
allowed for the open discussion of the Afghan national
security situation, particularly the relations between the
reforming MoD and General Staff and the commanders/
warlords from throughout the country. Discussions
ranged from the building of the Afghan National Army
(ANA) to the role that DDR would play in developing
this new security force. As can be imagined, discussions
were lively, but after 2 days the assembled group came
to an understanding about what was going to happen.
That does not mean that all were necessarily happy or
supportive of the arrangement, but they understood it.
The second day of the conference included a visit to
the Kabul Military Training Center where the Afghan,
French, British, and American trainers spent a few
hours explaining and demonstrating the tasks and
skills the Afghan Army was learning. The visit ended
with an opportunity for the commanders/warlords
to share lunch with new ANA soldiers in the dining
facility and spend time asking the troops questions
and assessing for themselves the capabilities of the new
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Army. The commanders were quite surprised to see a
force that was ethnically integrated down to the squad
level. The conference definitely helped the Afghans to
gain skills in negotiation and public speaking and also
subtly showed off to the commanders the new Army
supported by the coalition that was at the disposal of
the central government. Particularly, it allowed them
to compare the ANA with the regional militias still
under their control. This helped to increase acceptance
of the SSR strategy by Afghans outside the official
government channels, but as history shows it did not
heal all wounds and end all disputes.

Figure 3. Senior Commanders of the Northern
Alliance tour the Kabul Military Training Center
where the New Afghan Army was being built, April
21, 2003.
(Left to Right: Hazrat Ali, Atiqula Bariyali, Ismail
Khan, Atta Mohammad Atta, and Daud Khan)
The conference agenda included discussions on the
national vision and strategy, the current status of the
reform effort, shaping the Afghan forces, the principles
of organizing the military, training and equipping the
ANA, the support systems of the military, and a way
forward.21 This conference served many purposes, but
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it was particularly critical in pursuading Minister of
Defense Fahim Khan to support both the Coalition and
President Karzai’s plan to remove all the non-ANA
military personnel (Northern Alliance fighters) from
the Presidential Palace barracks (thus removing the
Alliance fighters from close proximity to a planned
ANA brigade). Shortly after this conference, the
Defense Minister gave in to these demands, paving the
way for a peaceful transition between the Northern
Alliance troops and the ANA after months of effort.22
This is just one example of the painfully slow yet
persistent approach that was necessary to communicate
peacefully with the Northern Alliance leaders in an
attempt to avoid another civil war or deadly uprising
that might sideline the entire SSR process.

Figure 4. A moment that would have been
unthinkable one year before as “once” bitter
enemies discuss the future of Afghanistan’s security
forces in a seemly manner, April 2003.
In July 2003 the Afghan government and UNAMA,
supported and resourced by the USSC, hosted the
Afghan SSR Symposium. It represented an opportunity
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for the President and his Cabinet to gather together all
the members of the Provincial and Central Government
and discuss the path forward for Afghanistan, to
include how the SSR process could and would aid
the development of the country. This event clearly
reinforced all the elements of the SSR strategy and was
seen by the majority of the attendees as a success. The
format consisted of a series of roundtable discussions
co-led by members of the Afghan government and
international organizations. The entire event was
filmed and aired on television for the Afghan people,
allowing them to observe their government in action
with pens and paper instead of Kalashnikovs. The SSR
Forum and Afghan government were pleased with the
outcome of the symposium, the final event of a long
drawn-out maneuver, despite the fact that turning
the discussion points into action would prove to be
difficult in the coming months. Such events, however
modest in their immediate successes, were moving
Afghanistan in the right direction and would be useful
models for later practitioners of SSR.

Figure 5. President Karzai flanked by the Afghan
and International team that participated in the SSR
Symposium, July 2003.
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As the head of the effort to reform the Afghan
military, the USSC enhanced the process through
three key weekly and monthly events. First were his
weekly information exchange and negotiating sessions
with the Deputy Minister of Defense Atiqulla Baryalai.
This Afghan leader was critical to MoD reform and
building the ANA and DDR. These efforts were closely
entwined, often requiring movement in one area to
allow progress in another. These sessions, which could
often last over 4 hours, yielded many concessions
from the Northern Alliance factions of the government
regarding decreased military capability among
the militias, thus paving the way for better overall
security. These events were also essential for showing
by example how business needed to be conducted in
the new MoD, thereby building Afghan government
capacity.
Second was his attendance at all graduations and
special events related to security forces training. Third
was his faithful monitoring and observation of the
training of security forces not only in Kabul, but also in
the provinces where they were conducting real world
operations. These latter two techniques allowed the
USSC to evaluate the capabilities of the forces and to
ensure participation of the Afghan government leaders
in these activities by his own presence. The techniques
provided valuable leverage, since the Afghans would
never want to be found lacking compared to an
American.
Bilateral and multilateral meetings with various
members of the Afghan and international team
consumed the majority of the USSC’s time. These ranged from late-night discussions with cabinet members
who had concerns with the actions of a particular
warlord, to in-depth planning and advisory sessions
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with President Karzai and the UN SRSG. Some of the
most useful meetings for determining the direction of
the SSR process were with UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi.
He was an excellent source of expertise and common
sense, rapidly boiling down problems and devising
workable solutions for the international community.
These meetings clearly supported the SSR strategy
except as related to building Afghan capacity. Separate
meetings with the UN SRSG and President Karzai
enabled the SSR leadership to learn what the Afghan
people wanted and needed from the international
community. These meetings also allowed the SSR
leaders to evaluate President Karzai’s competence as
he grew into his role of national leader. These and
numerous other meetings with President Karzai’s
Cabinet and staff helped the SSR leaders determine
the growth of the Afghan government’s capacity for
governing and ascertaining when they could increase
expectations.
Finally, the interaction between all the Afghan
leaders, regardless of their portfolio, and the SSR
forum members allowed the international community
to ensure an Afghan embrace of the SSR process and
make certain that its objectives were reinforcing the
goals of the other nonsecurity sectors in country. The
meetings included Afghans from all departments—
finance, reconstruction, tribal relations, information
and culture, health care, rural development, and
communications.23
It may be useful to view the SSR coordinator’s
agenda longitudinally in his meetings with Afghan and
international actors. Such a view will provide a rough
idea about the issues that seemed to rise to the top and
require action or discussion. Analysis of 4 months of
USSC meetings and events (over 500) suggests that 80
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percent of them were focused on meetings with the U.S.
Ambassador, SRSG Brahimi, and other UN officials; on
meeting with the leaders involved with reforming the
ANA and MoD; on discussions with USCENTCOM,
OSD, the Joint Staff, Deputy Minister Defense Baryalai,
Afghan Chief of Staff General Delawar, the CJTF-180
commander, the ISAF commander (police reforms,
counternarcotics activities), the DDR (judicial reform),
and Afghan ministers not involved with SSR. Within
that 80 percent, the majority of the SSR coordinator’s
time revolved around meetings with the U.S. Country
Team or the U.S. Ambassador; observing the ANA
or meeting with their trainers; meeting with key
Afghans and international leaders in informal settings;
negotiating with the Afghan Ministry of Defense
interlocutor; and communicating with U.S. Defense
and State department leaders.
The remaining 20 percent of the events focused
on executive level leaders from the United States and
Afghanistan, the leaders of other nations assisting in
building the ANA, Afghans at the provincial and tribal
level, militia commanders, other leaders from the
Afghan government, and international Afghan experts.
These meetings were generally designed to move the
SSR process forward by resolving conflicts among the
various actors and also by improving the capabilities
of the Afghan government through mentoring. Table
7 describes an agenda of a typical 3-day meeting
reflecting the diversity of players involved in the SSR
process and beyond.
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Day 1
0800	Meeting with U.S. State Department Political Officer,
U.S. Embassy
0830

Country Team Meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900

Meeting with BG Mulamaki, UN, subject DDR

0930

Update on ANA from ANA Design Team

1030	Pre-meeting for President Karzai, with U.S. and Japanese
Ambassadors, U.S. Embassy
1100

Meeting with President Karzai, Palace

1400

Meeting with Deputy Min Def Baryalai, MoD

1600	Observe Officer training with French Ambassador,
KMTC
1800

Dinner with Tribal elders, ANA recruiting

2200

Send out updates

Day 2
0700

Emails and phone calls

0830

Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900 	Discussions with Afghan officers in Brigade Staff officer
program
1030	Meeting with Afghan Generals, MG Karemi and BG
Khan, subject MoD Reform
1130	Discussions with French ISAF component, reference
ANA training support opportunities
1300	Graduation speaker, Presidents Protective Service
Special Agents
1400

Meeting with Minister of Finance, Finance Ministry

1730	Meeting with Afghan National Security Advisor, NSC
building
1900	Dinner with Commander British Forces, reference ANA
NCO training
2200

Send out updates		
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Day 3
0830

Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900

Meeting with PRT political officer from Mazar- e-Sharif

0930

ANA update brief from coalition trainers

1100	Meeting with Barnett Rubin, various Afghanistan
topics
1230

Background update with Financial Times reporter

1530	Meeting with Deputy Min of Def Baryalai, ANA-MoDDDR
1930 	Dinner with key leaders of Afghan Security Forces,
Ambassador Residence
2300

Send out updates

Table 7. Typical 3-Day USSC Meeting Agenda.
Two final areas should be discussed to explain the
SSR strategy adequately. First, there were unexpected
positive events that should be replicated by future SSR
practitioners. Unexpected positive events included
the following: nations such as France and others
stepped up to assist in reforming the military, even
though they did not sign up as a lead nation during
the Bonn process; many smaller nations or states that
could not send large numbers of troops were very
helpful to the production of a quality military force,
e.g., the French who were placed in charge of training
the ANA officers; nations that participated in the
ISAF mission continued to step forward and assist
in specific tasks and skills training of the ANA, e.g.,
medicine and mine detection; and ex-Warsaw Pact
officers that were assigned to the ANA design team
volunteered to assist in transforming the old Soviet
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tanks and inexperienced ANA tank troopers into an
armored fighting force. These types of serendipitously
offered skills and capabilities are often overlooked, but
should be capitalized on because they save precious
time and resources, especially considering the leadtime required in obtaining the additional expertise and
manpower through official U.S. channels.
Second are the frustrating issues that were associated
with SSR in Afghanistan but are difficult to avoid when
conducting this type of mission. The most frustrating
impediments were, at worst, interference from Afghanistan’s nearest neighbors, and, at best, their nonsupport.
Such impediments are likely typical in all areas where
SSR is undertaken. The distraction from the SSR
mission occasioned by such discussions with large
neighbor nations regarding their unhelpful actions
in Afghanistan is clearly trying but unfortunately
expected. Such states have to live in the neighborhood
and will be interacting with Afghanistan long after the
international community leaves. They therefore have
their own ideas about Afghanistan’s future.24
Assessing SSR in Afghanistan 2002-03.
This section employs the challenges and objectives
commonly associated with SSR, as highlighted by
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002), to evaluate the
efforts in Afghanistan. Most of the analysis is based
on the author’s personal observations and attendance
at meetings when these areas were being discussed.
Additional analysis comes from the judgments of other
participants.
One of the first points that Hendrickson and
Karkoszka (2002) make is that states cannot become
democratic and functional without a competent
security authority operating under oversight by civilian
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authority.25 It can surely be said that all members of
the SSR team understood this concept and worked
to create the proper oversight by civilians as they
developed expertise in the security sector. This is not
to say that the oversight was free of corruption or could
exercise sufficient power over the security forces, but
it was a pillar of the process. Clearly more effort must
be put into this area to yield success. Another point
they highlight is that earlier intervention forces often
ended up supplanting the local security forces with the
donor nation’s own military and failed to prepare the
state’s security entities for the future when the outside
actors would depart.26 This self-defeating process was
clearly not the intended model that the international
community used for Afghanistan. The ANA and Police
force were built and trained immediately and fielded
with Coalition forces as soon as they were capable of
operating as a unit. Within 1 year, the ANA forces were
earning high praise for their endurance and tenacity in
battle from the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF)
operating with them. The SSR forum also placed a
high premium on creating forces that the Afghan
government could safely control and continuously
afford.
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) here describe
three key elements of the shift from the old intervention
models to SSR:
1. The realignment of security forces’ focus from
state protection to the protection of the citizens in that
country, which means the civilian government must
be involved in the policy of security.
2. The correct choice of security forces selected by
the government to carry out the security policies.
3. Civilian government whose interests are
ultimately served by the chosen security policies.27
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These three factors, crucial to successful SSR, were
adhered to through the use of the Coalition forces
to protect the state’s sovereignty so that the Afghan
troops could focus internally on helping the coalition
secure the citizens. There were many discussions about
limiting the size of the army, focusing more efforts on
building police, and ensuring that President Karzai
was involved in security decisions, so as to guarantee
that the best interests of the nation were placed above
any factional groups.28 The authors felt that the SSR
agenda is the next logical step in resolving security
issues because it extends beyond the traditional focus
of civilian-military (CIVMIL) relations by pursuing
actual reform of security elements that will make or
break a nation’s recovery.29 This new paradigm for
simple CIVMIL relations was replaced with a reform
agenda that included all security sector areas and
any government body that could enhance security. In
this case, SSR was extended to include updates and
discussions with almost every ministry and deliberately
planned meetings with Afghan leaders at all levels of
government.
Their next observation really hits home as one
looks back at this endeavor. SSR was still not defined
by international consensus nor had the objectives and
priorities been agreed upon. At this stage, most of the
international actors were still working to understand
the complexities of SSR. They lacked the required
policies and institutions to conduct SSR in an integrated
manner.30 It is clear that although some states had a
fairly good grasp of the process, others were learning
as they went along, i.e., writing policy and developing
institutions through trial and error. Results would
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have been much better if a clear international model
had been available, understood, and accepted by the
actors. However, despite not having a consensus on
what SSR involved or a clear doctrine to follow, the
actors worked as a very effective team and followed
the U.S.-devised strategy very closely, thus increasing
efficiency and developing synergy.
The list below rank-orders the short-term objectives
of SSR as outlined by Hendrickson and Karkoszka,
showing which ones were pursued earliest. Although
there was focus on all of these objectives, some were
more immediately doable than others:
1. Make security forces effective.
2. Improve management of security expenditures.
3. Demobilize and reintegrate unneeded security
personnel.
4. Replace the military with a police force to provide
internal state security.
5. Remove military members from their political
roles.31
While all of these goals were determined to be worth
striving for, they are not all easily pursued at the same
time, and some can take years to achieve.
Additionally, Hendrickson and Karkoszka provide
seven basic governance objectives that should be part
of SSR; these were highlighted in the introduction.
The international actors found that pursuing all of
these objectives was worthy of the SSR team’s time.
Although success in accomplishing many of the
objectives relied on host countries capabilities, they
should be cornerstones of the process.
1. Professionalizing security forces was a
straightforward task so far as the Afghan army was
concerned. However, the process was not as easy with
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the police forces already in existence. Their bad habits
had become ingrained, and corruption was endemic.
2. Promoting capacity building among civilians for
providing policy and leadership supervision over the
security sector was essential. This was a more difficult
issue because these civilians had factional leanings
that had to be overcome. Additionally, development
was slow due to their level of participation in the SSR
process. For example, the judicial sector reform team
had a hard time getting the minister and the attorney
general to cooperate because of their personal, not
professional, relationship.
3. Instilling respect for human rights was difficult
due to the unspeakable level of violence and the
numerous atrocities that the Afghans had endured and
perpetrated. This is an area that most felt would take a
generation to correct.
4. Nurturing civil society into developing capabilities, such as monitoring the security sector and promoting change and providing input to the government on
security issues, was especially challenging because the
government was still forming and a legislative body
was not in place. This is one area in which the Afghans’
tribal culture proved useful, because the elders from
throughout the country had no qualms about voicing
their opinions and questioning security leaders. These
nurturing changes were slow to come due to the
factional nature of the government, but the mechanisms
were created to allow for this in the future.
5. Making basic information about security policy
known to the populace was a critical element of the
SSR team’s public information plan. Whenever Afghan
leaders and international actors traveled in the country,
they spread the news about the new security reforms.
The USSC made this a weekly event involving all
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members of the SSR team. Finally, the security sector
events and team members were open to the public and
news media except for especially sensitive meetings.
6. Ensuring that security sector elements are
operating within national and international law was
another straightforward task, but it was very difficult
to do with the limited manpower of some of the lead
nations and the high level of corruption found in so
many of the existing ministries.
7. Involving regional players in security issues so as
to obtain an integrated approach was difficult to achieve in practice and probably should have been pushed
more aggressively in the process. Though seemingly
based on common sense, pursuing this objective can
be a very dangerous endeavor because most regional
neighbors have certain objectives that conflict with
those of the nation undergoing reform. Afghanistan’s
history clearly shows a pattern of regional neighbors
interfering in its internal affairs for reasons other
than to assist the Afghan people.32 Hendrickson and
Karkoszka (2002) seem to offer a clarification of this
objective later in their article, noting that to truly
integrate a SSR program, the neighboring states that
have strategic interests in the recipient nation should
be viewed separately from other donors to ensure they
are not executing a hidden and harmful agenda.33
One of the concerns Hendrickson and Karkoszka
(2002) expressed was the possibility that subsequent
effects of September 11, 2001 (9/11) might cause future
interventions to return to the old model in which U.S.
goals and security of the state would take precedence
over the protection of the citizens.34 Although the initial
military intervention has sometimes been labeled
heavy-handed, from a very early stage the welfare
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of innocent Afghan people was elevated to the top of
the Coalition’s priority list. Within the SSR team, the
members clearly placed the welfare and safety of the
Afghans above U.S. military objectives, and there was
little need to worry about the security of the Afghan
state because of the overwhelming power of the U.S.led Coalition.
The SSR team faced many of the challenges outlined
by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) and made
attempts to overcome them.35 On one hand, a lack of
a shared definition of the SSR process made it hard to
evaluate progress, but the SSR team’s basic strategy
helped to define their purpose. On the other hand, the
lack of detailed individual reform area strategies with
clear end states made assessment of their current status
more difficult. The international support of the Afghan
SSR intervention may have been better than a purely
ad hoc or seat-of-the-pants approach,36 but they still
were not very well resourced. Most would agree that
by the year 2002, the international agencies still had not
developed the tools needed to assess the effectiveness
of SSR policy, but they certainly played a crucial part
in advising and assisting the leaders of the SSR team
in its drive toward successful ends. Hendrickson and
Karkoszka (2002) observe that the issue of receptivity
among recipient states arises because there is fear that
international actors are pushing western concepts
on them. This was clearly the feeling among some of
the Afghans, while others were receptive to change
and were not as particular about which culture it was
derived from. The SSR team understood the importance
of the buy-in from the Afghans and made it a key
element of their endeavor. Some of the SSR process may
indeed have been handicapped by the donor states’
emphasis on imposing western concepts and norms on
the Afghans, while other reformers tried to ensure that
36

the Afghan culture and way of doing business must be
sensitively accommodated when reforming. Building
the ANA presents a clear example of the latter, where
over five nations were involved in the training. In the
end, the Afghans were allowed to modify the training
to meet their values and institutional history. The
ANA had to be the Afghan’s institution, not that of the
Western builders.
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) also included
a section describing the special difficulties for SSR
programs in unfavorable environments, such as wartorn countries just emerging from long civil wars.
This section seems applicable to the present case.
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) noted that the
hardest place to conduct SSR is in a conflict-ridden area,
because the urgency for reforms can force a timetable
on the reformers. But the need for a functioning security
force may preclude the very reforms that are so sorely
needed. The SSR leadership had to guard against
requests to speed things up because they felt that, in
the long run, durable reform of high quality would be
more useful to Afghanistan than immediate reform
that proved transient. Unfortunately, the immediate
need for police forces often outweighed the desire to
train them correctly, and this caused problems for the
Afghans.
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) point out that
governments may be reluctant to take on reforms
because of weakness and lack of wherewithal. This
was recognized by the SSR team and became one of
the larger hurdles to overcome in the reform process,
especially in the sectors that were heavily factionalized.
In such sectors, reform could translate to loss of power
by one or another group. Often a lower priority was
given to national ownership of the reform, building
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civilian capacity, and developing a strategic planning
capability because of the dangers and uncertainties
in a war zone. To ensure it was done right the first
time, the SSR team held to the high priority to have
the Afghans take ownership of the process. That being
said, it was recognized by all members that they could
have done a better job of persuading the Afghans to
take ownership earlier in the process. It would be hard
to say that things would have gone any smoother if
the Afghans were involved sooner, because at the early
stages the international community was still trying to
figure out their objectives. Thus it might not be helpful
for the recipient country to have the early turmoil of
SSR strategy building as a model.
Two final points that were raised by Hendrickson
and Karkoszka (2002) bear discussion here. First, a
higher priority needs to be given to bringing together
the conflicting internal factions to address common
SSR issues and persuade them all to accept the concept.
This was recognized fairly early by the SSR team, and
many of the key events throughout the year were
geared towards this objective. The series of conferences
ending in the Afghan SSR Symposium present an
excellent example.37 Second, a point prophetically
made by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) was
that other perspectives, like those of NGOs and SSR
experts, are often absent from the SSR discussion and
therefore are not integrated into the SSR policy.38 As
noted in the introduction, this was one of the measures
that probably could have had a huge beneficial effect
on the coordination between development and aid
organizations and the SSR team. The points made
by Hendrickson and Karkoszka would form a useful
checklist for planners of SSR operations and would
serve as an assessment tool to check the status of
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the program once under way. The Afghan SSR team
made many strides towards addressing some of the
objectives and challenges facing it but clearly fell short
on others.
Grading the SSR Strategy.
After reviewing many of the assessments of SSR in
Afghanistan, we find that the pillars of the program have
been evaluated many times over.39 What better way to
grade the SSR process than to ask the architect of the
plan what he thought of their efforts in implementing
it? General Eikenberry made the following assessment
after serving in Afghanistan as the commander of the
Coalition forces in 2005 and working at NATO as the
Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.
His advice to me in writing this paper was to make
sure that you do not exclude treatment of our faults,
because the paper will not be useful if it says simply,
“We did great, but everyone else screwed things up.”40
Table 8 highlights the final assessment of the SSR
strategy based on what the SSR team originally set out
to do in October 2002.
1. Establish a forum that initially provides a conduit for
information sharing about SSR issues but later becomes a
vehicle for collaboration among the key actors. Grade: A- to
B+
2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively
manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest. Grade:
B+ to A3. Build the Afghan government capacity. Grade: C4. Develop consensus-based strategic plans that identify and fix
problems by leveraging the resources from all actors’ nations
or the international community. Grade: D

Table 8. Grading Implementation of the SSR
Strategy, 2002-03.
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Thoughts for Improvement in SSR.
Based upon the analysis of the SSR process in
Afghanistan as well as the collective thoughts of
people who have executed SSR in one of the most
difficult environments in the world, many lessons have
emerged.
Communication:
• The chain of command for the USSC was a bit
murky partly because of the novelty of having
a Security Coordinator. In the U.S. model, we
traditionally have had field commanders and
diplomats, whereas in 2002 we had a hybrid
position that fell in the middle.
• The USSC received excellent basic guidance
from the senior operational commander: Be
transparent in all endeavors and coordinate
with all appropriate parties so no one was
surprised. Specifically, he laid down the
requirements that (1) the ANA be ethnically
integrated down to the squad level and that only
he would make a decision to break that rule; (2)
all recommendations and requests for resources
from DoD would go through him to ensure
that all resource requests were synchronized;
and (3) that with regard to all Coalition actions,
it be made clear and distinct to the Afghan
government as to the role of the CJTF-180,
on one hand, and the roles of the dual-hatted
USSC/OMC-A on the other. These basic rules
made things run very smoothly and should be
modified very little for future operations.
• The chain of command should be clarified
back to Washington, DC (or any capital), and
40

the reporting process for requests of non-DoD
specific assets. It should be more specific about
who needs to know what is not working and
how those issues can be fixed rapidly. The role
that the U.S. Ambassador plays if he is not the
USSC should also be clarified. Responsibility
for solutions for nonmilitary issues of security
should be made clear. The Security Coordinator
may or may not be the right person to
communicate these issues directly with the
Administration. All OMC-A (ANA building)
tasks, are a DoD function, so the DoD chain of
command should be used. With USSC (SSR)
tasks, it is not as clear because one is coordinating the efforts of other nations. So when a
problem with a nation’s efforts surfaces that it
cannot or will not resolve, the issue arises as
to where the problem is referred—the United
States, that country’s national government, or
the UN?
• Not all nations have a clear mandate or the ability
to reinforce their efforts. For example, when the
United States realized it needed more resources
to build the ANA and reform the MoD, it
requested and received the increased resources
it asked for, but it was not the same for other
states. For initial SSR planning conferences,
(1) nations must develop a clear channel to
communicate to their government what they
need (including all instruments of national
power), and (2) initial international plans need
to be more specific as to how a state is going to
fulfill its role if it signs on as a lead nation in
the SSR process (end state sought and means of
transport to theater should be in writing).
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• Fortunately for the SSR team, some public
incidents and failures helped to speed resources
to Afghanistan, but overall the assistance and
priority given to the enterprise by all states
and the UN were inadequate to the task. It may
never be known whether the SSR team was
not asking the right people for help or whether
donor governments were not listening, but it is
clear that the resources were not received.
Staffing:
• Experts in SSR and related skill sets should be
assembled before departure so they can plan as
a team before hitting the ground. It is not useful
to have an ad hoc staff that gets replacements
by luck of the draw. For example, the OMC-A
consisted of eight people when the USSC arrived,
and most members of the original team did not
know each other before arriving in Afghanistan.
The leadership did not select future additions
to the team, and new members often had to
be returned home and replaced with more
qualified people. This process wasted time and
caused continuity issues between the Afghans
and Coalition.
• The staff and units involved with SSR need to
be large and diverse enough to complete the
mission. Specifically, it is advisable to ensure
that key SSR staff members possess experience
in stability and reconstruction or nation
building. For example, Lieutenant Colonel
Mark Thomas from the British Army was an
engineer officer with this type of background
and was particularly invaluable in the effort.
It would also be advisable to have SSR staff
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members with backgrounds in the particular
pillars that are being reformed, in this case, rule
of law, development of security forces, ministry
of defense, and counternarcotics. But as useful
as these types of skill set are to the team,
building one’s own parallel SSR team that may
start interfering in the pillars assigned to other
nations is to be avoided. Each team’s role is to
assist the SSR coordinator in making strategic
analysis and recommending future policies
within the areas of responsibility assigned to
the team.
Interagency Issues:
• There is a need for a better mechanism to
ensure coordination and unity of effort among
the disparate government agencies, both in the
recipient country and back in the donor nation
capitals.
Leadership:
• Whether the SSR coordinator should be a civilian
or military leader is irrelevant in the long run.
The true test of who should fill this role comes
down to the questions: Does the candidate have
the skills and attributes needed to fulfill the job
description? Can he or she plan strategically?
Does he or she have leadership skills? Is he or
she a problem-solver?
Implementation:
• From the beginning, SSR forum meetings
should include the recipient nation actors so
as to increase their sense of ownership in the
process more quickly. Also it is ill-advised to
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hold a first meeting without a solid plan and
having conducted rehearsals to ensure that the
recipient nations attendees are not turned off by
the lack of organization.
• The true collaboration point among international SSR teams should be arrived at immediately,
and more emphasis placed on the capacity
building of the recipient government and key
actors. If recipient government positions are set,
then immediately involve the person in that job
during the lead nation role assignment planning
(in this case the Bonn process) to ensure that
nations understand the issues and the key
players are involved before they sign up for it.
• A more defined agreement should be reached
on what the lead nations’ responsibilities are
and how they intend to shoulder them. This
will allow better coordination between those
nations, particularly in complementing each
other in dealing with the overlapping nature of
SSR pillars. Such coordination will also enhance
the ability of nations to impact other lead nations.
Examples are the close ties between DDR,
ANA, and Police building efforts, or the need
to tie the rule of law reform to prison reform,
each of which responsibility was assigned to
a different team. More specific questions need
to be answered during the planning process
such as: Who has the responsibility to reform
prisons? Should it be the lead nation for police
building or justice reform? Such decisions will
require more analysis before a lead nation signs
on to an endeavor, but it would help ensure that
the right people are sent into the country and
that the coordinating parties know who they
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will need to work with on issues that cut across
functional boundaries.
• The NGO/IGO/functional area experts should
be formally involved in the SSR process. A
board of SSR advisors should be created that
can offer policy ideas and surge to assist the
lead nations that are struggling with manpower
or other resource constraints. Such SSR experts
need to step forward forcefully with solutions
even if the SSR coordinator does not call
upon them and invite them to take part. The
coordinator himself is likely under-resourced
and short on time, so he cannot possibly know
who all the experts are and what type of parallel
subject matter resources exist. Likewise, the SSR
leadership needs to make room for these assets
at the table and treat them as team members,
not visitors. This involvement should take place
not only in the recipient country but in each
donor nation so that experts can solve problems
on both ends.
RULES OF THUMB AND BEST PRACTICES
1. Ensure close coordination between the separate
pillars of SSR, e.g., the DDR drawdown and the ANA/
Police stand-up.
2. Employ the format and scheduling (monthly) of
SSR meetings (see Appendix E).
3. Be prepared and anticipate when to begin
moments of intense lobbying to get some of the host
nation actors to buy in to the process (e.g., the U.S. team
spent 3 weeks pushing MoD reforms using marathonlong meetings and multiple approaches to wear
down the Afghan resistance to the new policy, thus
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reaching an early agreement with the MoD regarding
restructuring and reforms.
4. Use dinners and lunches to squeeze in more
meetings and mentoring time in the work day. Many
critical issues were ironed out between Afghan
government and tribal leaders over meals late at night
when they were not influenced by their followers.
They could speak more freely and discuss options that
they could not mention in front of their subordinates
or superiors. In just 3 months, over 40 working meals
that lasted late into the night yielded very useful
information and agreements. Topics of discussion
ranged from getting rural recruits to Afghan Army
and Police recruiting centers in the provinces to the
equitable promotion of officers within the MoD.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS IN NEED OF
RESEARCH
It seems that the position of USSC was not continued
as a single primary duty position in Afghanistan after
2003. Accordingly, the number of formal SSR events
dwindled as a result of this decreased emphasis.41 If
this continues to be the case, it would seem to signal
the importance of having a senior leader with SSR as a
sole-responsibility portfolio to ensure that the process
does not decline in scope and emphasis. It would also
be useful for planners to determine what the refined
mission objectives and goals would be for this position
if it was reinstated in Afghanistan today. Finally, if
the United States is going to continue to lead SSR
missions in the future, it might be useful to create the
position of SSR coordinator on the NSC to integrate
and synchronize all agencies and departments. This
would fulfill the requirements and needs of the Security Coordinators in all the nations where the United
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States is conducting SSR. The USSC’s in each country
could report their needs directly to the NSC after
discussions with the Ambassador and/or military
commander of that nation to ensure that the State and
Defense departments are not surprised by any requests
that would need to be filled by them in support of the
SSR mission. Contemplating such a change would
lead to a further topic of study: how would that chain
of command work, or is it time to reform our entire
national security structure if SSR is going to be a key
mission of the U.S. Government in the future.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Is this a model for the future? It appears that this
model, with modifications as outlined above, would
prove to be successful in similar endeavors. While not
achieving a glowing record of success, the strategy
and implementation set the Afghan nation on a path
towards better governance and security. The 2008
NATO report, Progress in Afghanistan, shows that many
of the initiatives started by this forum have continued
and are coming to fruition.42 It is instructive to keep
in mind a passage that Hendrickson and Karkoszka
provided in their insightful article: “In war-torn states,
a clear national vision to reform is not possible . . .
attempting SSR may actually mobilize an opposition
against change . . . this makes security sector reform a
long-term endeavor.”43
Hopefully this paper has described the formal SSR
process that was enacted in Afghanistan and pointed
out its key successes and critical failings. Future SSR
leaders will need to understand the pitfalls and models
that the United States has already experienced and
tested.
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The efforts of SSR from fall 2002 through fall 2003
may have been summed up best by the UN SRSG Mr.
Lakhdar Brahimi during the fifth SSR meeting. That
day his opening statement emphasized that SSR was
the key to the future of Afghanistan. He emphasized
to the lead nations the need to remain patient because
of the level of devastation attending the starting point
for this process. He reminded the participants that
eventually the Afghan counterparts would take more
of a lead role and that instant progress was not a hope
that any nation’s government should be holding.
Most significantly, he pointed out that the SSR
work being done by this international team was “as
good as he had seen anywhere else in the world,”44
but he followed that compliment with a warning that
this was still not enough to get the Afghan capacity
up to par and succeed in the long run. Everyone must
dig deeper, he reminded the group, and must always
bring the Afghans along every step of the way.45
Special Representative Brahimi closed his remarks
by emphasizing that the inclusion of Afghans in the
SSR meetings and policies had been part of the strategy
from the genesis of the team, and that it must remain
on the agenda in the future.
Even after successful implementation and sharing
of SSR ideas, the real test for the state is how well the
next generation of leaders of security sectors continue
to adhere to the reforms. It is here that one will see
whether the required norms and values continue in the
new methods, or whether the leaders fall back on the
previous mentality and practices.46
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APPENDIX A
SSR PLAYERS AND THEIR ROLES
Head of the SSR Forum, the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
Lakhdar Brahimi, UNAMA
United States Security Coordinator (USSC), Major
General Eikenberry, day-to-day control of SSR and
Military Reform operations
Ambassador Eberle and DCM Schlaudraff of Germany,
Brigadier General Wolf, Head German Police
Project, Police Reform
Ambassador Finn and Ambassador Taylor of the
United States, Military Reform and Reconstruction,
respectively
Ambassador Nash of the United Kingdom, Counter
Narcotics and ANA Building
Ambassador Komano and DCM Miyahara of Japan,
Colonel Ando, Military Advisor, DDR
Ambassador Domenico Giorgi of Italy, Judicial
Reform
Ambassador Guinhut of France, ANA Building
Mrs. Frederique de Man, Chargé-Netherlands
Mr. Sultan Aziz from UNAMA, DDR
Mr. Jean Arnault the Deputy to Special Representative
Brahimi, SSR and UN operations, UNAMA
ISAF Commanders or Deputy Commanders and their
Political Advisors, Security of Kabul
President Karzai, Afghan buy-in of all SSR operations
National Security Advisor Dr. Rassoul
President’s Chief of Staff Said Jawad
Vice President and Minister of Defense Marshall Fahim,
Military Reform
Deputy Minister of Defense Atiqulla Baryalai, Military
Reform and DDR
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Ministers of Interior Wardak and Jalali, Police reform
Minister of Justice Karimi, Judicial Reform
Mr. Robin Barnwell, UNAMA-Political Officer
Mr. Adam Boulokos, Deputy UNODC
Mr. Mark Clayton, 1st Secretary CN-UK
Mrs. Annett Guenther and Mr. Adriaan Kooiymans,
ISAF Political Advisors
Brigadier General Olli-Matti Multamaki, Senior
Military Advisor-Finland
Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Stahnke, Military AdvisorGermany
Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Hughes, Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Henry
Eagan, and Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager,
U.S. Security Assistants to the USSC.

50

APPENDIX B
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
ANA

ANP
CJTF180

CN
DDR

GoA
ISAF

MoD
MoI
NA

Afghan National Army, created to replace
the militia/warlord system and existing
Army skeleton, one of the five SSR
pillars
Afghan National Police, one of the five SSR
pillars
Combined Joint Task Force-180, operational
command headquarters for coalition
forces headed by an American threestar General
Counter-Narcotics, one of the five SSR
pillars
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, program intended to increase security by carefully managing
the drawdown of existing unsanctioned
security forces, one of the five SSR
pillars
Government of Afghanistan
International Security Assistance Force,
NATO force initially sent to provide
security for Kabul the capital of
Afghanistan
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of the Interior
Northern Alliance, loose confederation of
warriors who fought the Taliban and
al-Qaeda before and then alongside the
U.S. led Coalition invasion.

51

OMC-A

SSR
SRSG
USSC

Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan, agency headed by Major General
Eikenberry responsible for building
the Afghan National Military and
reforming the Afghan Ministry of
Defense
Security Sector Reform
Special Representative of the Secretary
General, UN Secretary General’s Envoy
to Afghanistan
United States Security Coordinator, the
other title MG Eikenberry held, responsible for the expedited development of the SSR process
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APPENDIX C
DUTIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR USSC AND
CHIEF OF THE OMC-A
Description of overall task per duty title:
1. USSC: Expedite the development of Security Sector
Reform (SSR) within Afghanistan by synchronizing
relevant efforts of the United Nations and those of
the Geneva-designated SSR lead nations for law
enforcement (Germany), justice (Italy), counternarcotics
(UK), Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
(Japan and UN), and the Armed Forces (United States).
Ensure SSR programs are consistent with Government
of Afghanistan policy goals and objectives.
2. Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A): Plan and direct U.S./Coalition
efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan
National Army (ANA) Central Corps by June 2004.
Solicit international donations for building the Afghan
Armed Forces.
3. As both USSC and Chief of the Office of Military
Cooperation: Advise the U.S. Ambassador, CJTF-180,
USCENTCOM, and the Department of Defense on
security sector and ANA Issues.
Major Objectives:
1. USSC:
Establish SSR forum in Kabul with participation
of UNAMA, the 5 lead SSR nations, and the
government of Afghanistan
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Promote expansion of organizational SSR capacities
of lead nation embassies in Kabul
Facilitate acceleration of SSR work in the provinces
Coordinate transfer of Border Police training
responsibility from the United States to another
appropriate lead nation
Develop complementary ANA building and Afghan
DDR plans that are politically and logistically
feasible.
2. Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation:
Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3
Brigades by October 1, 2003
Develop and begin implementation of Afghan
MoD/General Staff reform plan
Establish ANA institutional support systems
including officer and NCO schools, ANA
training and doctrine directorate, and garrison
support elements
Design and build OMC-A structure consisting
of U.S./Coalition military, contractor, and
Afghan civilian and military personnel capable
of managing the ANA building program as it
increases in scope and complexity
Increase international and Afghan domestic
support for and confidence in ANA through the
maintenance of quality within the force and the
conduct of effective information operations.
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APPENDIX D
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED WITH SSR AND/
OR AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU),
Kabul. www.areu.org.af/
The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, UK. www.iiss.org/
Global Facilitation Network for SSR (gff ssr), University
of Birmingham, UK. www.ssrnetwork.net
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Development Co-operation Directorate
(OECD DAC) Handbook on Security System Reform
(SSR), Paris, France. www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en
_2649_33721_37417926_1_1_1_1,00.html
International Peace Institute (Academy), UN, New
York. www.ipacademy.org/our-work/state-building, www.
ipacademy.org/publications/books-occasional-papers
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington,
DC. www.usip.org
NATO, Brussels, Belgium.
afghanistan/index.html

www.nato.int/issues/

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),
Bonn, Germany. www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/index.php
Human Rights Watch, New York and worldwide
locations. hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=afghan
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The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, and
Brussels, Belgium. www.dcaf.ch/ “One of the world’s
leading institutions in the areas of security sector
reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG).”
USAID Conflict Management, Washington, DC. www.
usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
focus_areas/security.html
UN Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, (PEP).
www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/
The Stabilisation Unit, UK Government. www.
stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.html
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, Department of State, Washington, DC.
www.state.gov/s/crs/
International Crisis Group. www.crisisgroup.org/home/
index.cfm?id=3946
Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC. www.
stimson.org
Peace Studies Journal, UK. www.peacestudiesjournal.org
Department for International Development, UK. www.
dfid.gov.uk/
Conflict, Security, and Development Group, Kings
College, London, UK. www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/
groupresearch/int/csdg/
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Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle, PA. https://pksoi.army.mil/
Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield
University, UK. www.ssronline.org/
Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP)
Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands. www.clingendael.
nl/cru/
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Stability Operations Capabilities, Pentagon.
www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/
stabilityOps/index.html
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
www.csrs-nps.org/
The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. www.ccmr.org/
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APPENDIX E
EXAMPLE MEETING NOTES (EDITED) OF AN
SSR FORUM47

MINUTES
5th SECURITY SECTOR REFORM MEETING
Monday 17 th February 2003, 1000-1200, Japanese
Embassy Conference Room
Attendees
1. Col (Military Advisor-Japan)
2. Mr A (UNAMA-DSRSG)
3. Mr. A (UNAMA-DDR)
4. Mr. B (UNAMA-Political Officer)
5. BG B (ISAF Dep Cdr)
6. Mr B (UNAMA-SRSG)
7. Mr. B (Dep UNODC)
8. Mr. C (1st Sec CN-UK)
9. MG E (Security Coord-U.S.)
10. Amb G (Ambassador-Italy)
11. Mrs. G (ISAF Political Advisor)
12. Amb K (Amb-Japan)
13. Mr. K (ISAF PolAd)
14. Mrs. M (Chargé-Netherlands)
15. Mr. M (DCM-Japan)
16. BG M (Senior Military Advisor-Finland)
17. Amb N (Amb-UK)
18. Mr. S (DCM-Germany)
19. Lt Col S (MilAd-GE)
20. Amb T (Donor Asst-U.S.)
21. Lt Col T (U.S. Security Asst)
22. BG W (Head German Police Project)
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Purpose: Meeting hosted by Japanese Embassy
intended to address issues, progress, and
strategies related to ANA building, counternarcotics, law enforcement, DDR, and judicial
reform.
Introductory Remarks:
USSC welcomes attendees of the 5th meeting,
recognizing special guests and accomplishments.
Chairman stated that this was a focused group with
an overarching strategy and dialogue that were
now well established. Although these sessions
had become very productive, we would keep to
the planned 2-hour duration.
Pointed out that as yet there had been little positive
routine engagement with the Afghans in the
security sector reform (SSR) area, and this would
need to be discussed later in the meeting.
SSR should be looked at on a holistic basis as all
lanes interrelate. For example, the imminent
implementation of DDR will prove to be a
catalyst for the ANA, Police, CN, and the
Judiciary sectors. All will be required to support
the DDR process as it rolls out across the country
on a phased basis.
UNAMA Perspective:
Mr. Brahimi, SRSG-UNAMA, stated that SSR was
key to the future of Afghanistan. He made the
point that the nation needed to be built up from
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scratch and that as a consequence, it was essential
to remain patient above all else. The work would
be done by counterparts—eventually, but one
should not expect instant progress.
He added that although the SSR work done here by
the international community (IC) was as good
as he had seen anywhere else in the world, this
on its own was not enough.
We must strive to bring Afghans with us in our
efforts; in short, we should make the Afghans
help themselves. This was a key point, and he
was pleased to see it included on the agenda.
From the very genesis of these meetings, Afghan
inclusion had always been envisaged.
Comments on recent successful Afghan leaders,
felt that we should continue to develop such
people.
Mr. Brahimi thanked certain attendees for their
patient and determined approach in pushing
DDR forward over the last few weeks
particularly. He stressed that if the DDR process
proved to be successful, it would represent a
giant leap forward for both SSR and also for the
future of Afghanistan.
Lead Nations Update:
U.S. (ANA)
• MG Eikenberry highlighted the theme of MoD
reform recently discussed with Marshall Fahim.
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Afghan MoD reform had two aspects—structural
and political. Political reform is critically
important because it will also contribute to
increased confidence in the impartiality of the
MoD, and thereby facilitate both DDR and ANA
recruiting.
• Mr. Brahimi agreed with the significance of
MoD reform and suggested that engagement
with Fahim be continued into the future on a
more regular basis and on broader issues. On a
different subject, institution building remained
very important for Afghanistan and so reform
of the MoD, when it happened, would greatly
help this process. “A Kabul Government for all
Afghans” was the message to be pursued.
• MG Eikenberry outlined deployments of ANA
forces to the provinces, currently Bamian and
Orgun. Although these missions represented
good tactical level successes, there was also a
strategic/political level benefit. The deployments
sent the message that the Government of
Afghanistan (GoA) was now able to project
military power beyond Kabul and perhaps at
the same time, persuade some of the undecided
factional groups to enter the DDR process and
behave in an appropriate manner or eventually
risk exclusion from a reconstituted Nation.
Increasing emphasis now needed to be placed
on reassuring Afghans of the good intentions of
the GoA by using an “effects based” approach,
to include more extensive media activities to
generate confidence and trust. There were not
enough ANA to garrison every major town, so
a realistic alternative had to be thought out and
implemented.
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• DCM Schlaudraff informed the meeting that
he had recently visited Mazar-e Sharif. While
there, key individuals had stated that they
were aware of the new ANA but had no details
about how to join, etc. MG Eikenberry agreed
that this was an area which might benefit from
further development, while explaining that
U.S./Coalition had started to take Governors to
KMTC to show them the ANA training regime
and give them the opportunity to speak to
their soldiers. This appeared to be a promising
initiative and other opinion formers were very
welcome to visit ANA training to see it for
themselves.
Italy (Judicial)
• Amb. Giorgi reported that he had already met
with Minister Jalali and had found him to be very
cooperative and helpful. He was now confident
that there were several areas within the judicial
sector which could be readily advanced with his
assistance. Amb. Giorgi reported that there had
been limited development of the Judicial Sector
“Master Plan” since the last meeting as many
key members of the Judicial Commission had
been absent from the country and were only
now arriving back.
• Amb. Georgi made the following additional
observations:
		 o Mr. Brahimi’s help was requested to alert
President Karzai to the urgent requirement
to identify a suitable government building
to house the Judicial Commission, consisting
of some 12 members plus secretariat. The

62

		

		

present building was too small and was
unworkable.
o Italy was currently deploying 1,000 troops
as part of CJTF-180 to operate in the area of
Khowst. To assist them in their mission, a
number of projects were being identified to
benefit the local people and generate good
will. The support provided will be both
bilateral and multilateral in nature with the
full involvement of the GOA. In addition,
Italy was contributing two personnel to the
Gardez PRT who would also be directly
involved in related operations. Amb. Giorgi
planned to hold a meeting soon to discuss
this work in greater detail with interested
parties.
o Amb Georgi expects his Judiciary Team to be
augmented by six MFA and MoJ personnel
by the end of the month, including one
prominent senior-level judicial expert who
will travel between Rome and Kabul.

Germany (Law Enforcement)
• DCM Schlaudraff stated that he would cover
four areas, starting with MoIreform, which had
now been stalled for some months reportedly
awaiting President Karzai’s approval. The old
plan for structural reform had actually been
further revised under Minister Jalali and was
much improved. It was worth noting that
police represented only one of many important
divisions in the new structure. The intention
now was to widen the German remit, and an
advisor will be sent to look at broader MoI reform
aspects. Some infrastructure related work in the
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MoI will also be undertaken. Other nations had
also provided assistance, for example, UK DFID
had provided a budget advisor to assist the
MoI with this important task. The DCM asked
UNAMA to note at this stage, that MoI would
be technically responsible for elections in the
future and would therefore benefit from any
experience or exposure to the process that could
be given to them as the preparations for June 04
were ramped up. Mr. Brahimi then pointed out
that a National Committee would be appointed
to supervise the elections and that a team of
experts would soon be arriving to consider all
aspects of this and provide advice.
• The second point concerned the requirement
for a Presidential decree on the police, along
the same lines as the earlier Bonn decree for
the ANA. A first draft had been produced and
commented on. Thirdly, in order to get police
into the provinces quickly, Minister Jalali wanted
to create a Highway Patrol to cover the major
roads in Afghanistan. The DCM felt that this
would be both a visible and relevant mission.
The next step would be to create a commission
to look at this under Secretary of State Halal
and the necessary planning to achieve this was
already underway.
• Fourth point concerned the Border Police (BP)
situation. MG Eikenberry set the scene regarding
the recent Norwegian fact finding visit which
had been successful. Important follow-up
meetings were scheduled to take place in Oslo
on 18 Feb which would involve U.S., Germany,
UK, France, Italy and other Nordic nations. This
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was an encouraging response and the political
decision would be forthcoming from Oslo in due
course. Walter Wolf then gave a quick summary
of the recent BP Working group meeting and
noted that roles and missions and a definition of
BP had been achieved. Afghan ownership was
being established with future meetings planned
to consider structures of BP and then training
aspects. Significant progress was being made in
this area that was encouraging after a lackluster
start.
• Of more general interest was the planned visit
of the German Minister of the Interior in March.
This was now the target date for the decree to
be issued on the police and for MoI structural
reforms to have been announced. Tied in
with this as well, would be the next Police
Commanders Seminar in Kabul. The most
significant police training currently awaited in
Afghanistan would be the U.S.-led patrolmen
courses for 7,000 individuals.
• MG Eikenberry asked about the drive for a
nationally representative MoI, like the MoD
reform issue. In his reply the DCM suggested
that the Minister had picked the more difficult
individuals to change first and had therefore
experienced difficulties. It is hoped that this
would be addressed in the future.
U.S./Coalition CJTF-180 (Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and Information Work)
• COL Purdy spoke about emerging lessons from
PRT’s, beginning with the caveat that it was still
“early days” within the life of the PRT concept
and that these points had not been staffed fully.
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As such, they more accurately represented his
own observations:
		 o Vital to select the right individuals for the
key posts. Induction and orientation was
also very important as were close links with
organizations operating in the same areas
such as the UNAMA field teams and others.
		 o Establishing the PRT takes time. There was
an expectation management aspect to all of
this so that instant results were not assumed.
Progress would be gradual.
		 o Important to clearly differentiate between
combat elements and the PRT proper.
This would become clearer with time and
experience.
		 o There is presently no clear mechanism to
link province to central government. This
needs to be addressed. Governor to Minister
level is working well however.
		 o PRT is partly there to gather and share
information. There is therefore a requirement
for a government information management
system to be set up. National input is key to
the value of PRT in this respect.
		 o Engagement with local militias and police is
developing slowly in the provinces. This will
evolve and improve gradually over time.
• Mr. Brahimi said he was watching the progress
of the PRT’s with interest and he endorsed the
need to pick the best people for the PRT task as
he felt that first impressions with local leaders
would be very important. Amb. Taylor made
the point that Minister Jalali had also suggested
sending senior government representatives
to join PRTs to provide a physical central
government presence on the ground.
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• COL Wood then spoke as the Director of
Information Operations CJTF-180. He stated that
his mission was to help GoA get key messages
to the Afghan people by the most appropriate
means. To accomplish this, he had two mobile
broadcast systems which could cover the
majority of the country as well as a newspaper
product printed in English, Dari, and Pashtun.
Some 50,000 copies were distributed every two
weeks. A recent initiative had also seen the
distribution of 50,000 hand-cranked radios that
would allow more of the populace to listen to
important radio messages. COL Wood stated
that he worked closely with the Ministry of
Information and Culture and Afghan Radio
and TV. In this way, it was possible to transmit
interviews with GoA officials for example, from
Kabul, then transmit them across the country
using in-place resources. The longer term intent
was to help produce a flourishing free media
eventually while contributing to the SSR process
in any way possible in the shorter term.
• CAPT Weizer from ISAF then spoke about
the benefits of Radio Sada-e Azadi (Voice of
Freedom) which had been operational for some
seven months and had the potential to reach
three million Afghans, broadcasting 24 hours
a day in a variety of languages. In addition to
educational and entertainment based content,
the station would transmit GoA or ISAF
policy information, including public safety
and security notices. This could range from a
warning about children carrying toy weapons
to the promotion of the ANA as a national force
for good. Liaison between ISAF assets and the
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CJTF-180 teams had already been established
and the coordinated creation of joint products
was ongoing, to include the print media.
ISAF (Initial Mission Assessment)
• BG Bertholee introduced himself as Deputy
Cdr ISAF III and explained that LTG van Heyst
would attend future meetings. He handed out
a presentation explaining the commander’s
mission and his intent. He added that full
operational capability would be achieved on 5
March—having taken over from ISAF II on 10
February. The five main lines of operation were
described briefly as follows:
		 o Ensure a safe environment.
		 o Reconstitute Afghan authorities.
		 o Improve the capability of Afghan police and
armed forces.
		 o Operate KIA and maintain ALOC.
		 o Force protection measures and improved
situational awareness.
• The new focus for the ISAF III deployment would
be a clearer division and increased coordination
between ISAF and KMNB activities, a greater
emphasis on civil-military cooperation and an
enhanced liaison structure with respect to CJTF180, the Afghan authorities together with their
military and police assets, and also NGO’s.
BG Bertholee suggested that the unit emblem
with the motto “Together we are strong” was
particularly applicable to the situation in
Afghanistan.
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• Mr. Brahimi welcomed the ISAF III
representatives and stated that he looked
forward to working with them in the future.
MG Eikenberry made the observation that with
the arrival of the DDR process in the Spring/
Summer, and the approach of the Constitutional
Loya Jirga and elections, DDR in Kabul would
need to be addressed in due course. ISAF III
would be required to play a key role in preparing
the conditions for this and for implementation
aspects also.
Japan (DDR):
• Amb. Komano stated the Japanese wish to achieve two main objectives from the forthcoming
Tokyo Conference to be attended by President
Karzai. The first was to encourage further
donors to come forward from the international
community (IC) by highlighting unequivocal
Afghan support and commitment to the DDR
process. The second was to use the conference
as a springboard for the rapid implementation
of DDR. Although considerable progress had
recently been made in this area, much still
remained to be achieved in a short timeframe.
Amb. Komano stressed the importance of
putting the DDR process into perspective in
terms of broader SSR aims. This holistic approach
was not well understood by the Afghan side.
President Karzai and Marshall Fahim were both
now clear on this. Ambassador Komano then
outlined the following tasks which he believed
the GoA needed to accomplish before the Tokyo
Conference:
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o The Four Defense Commission subcommissions needed to announce full details
regarding membership, Terms of Reference,
etc., and progress of their work.
o An Advisory Committee must be established
in accordance with the President’s
earlier decree which would encourage
further support from the IC, and provide
transparency.
o The Defense Commission should meet
before President’s departure to endorse subcommission's work and receive progress
reports to date. They would have the
opportunity to also discuss and endorse
the major policy issues to be announced
by the President in Tokyo. There was also
a need to formally introduce the Advisory
Committee.
o The time frame for the process needed to be
outlined. It is proposed that Karzai deliver
a speech on 21 March (Islamic New Year)
announcing a start date for DDR and when
it should finish—hopefully after one year, in
time for the June 2004 elections, though the
Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP),
the re-integration program itself, would go
on for 3 years.
o DDR implementation would have to be
sequenced, with a phase 1 plan clearly laid out
and targeted on an area with a good chance
of success. Any power vacuum created by
DDR must be filled, possibly by deployment
of the ANA, but police and judiciary would
also be important in this regard.
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• Amb. Komano believed it was important to
make explicit the eligibility criteria for DDR.
This would produce a realistic target figure.
Not everyone with a gun, for example, would
qualify. The aim of DDR was to dissolve active
duty security forces, which included factional
armies. The target figure would be discussed
in detail, together with other sensitive issues
in the days leading up to 21 March speech by
the President, when detailed implementation
aspects would also be announced. Progress over
recent weeks had been hampered by the lack
of key leaders being available in Afghanistan.
Amb. Komano stressed that donor nations
also needed to adopt a coordinated funding
approach to DDR. As a final comment, Amb.
Komano mentioned that the Japanese Embassy
was being reinforced with two DDR experts to
assist them in their task. These were welcome
and necessary additions.
UK (Counternarcotics)
• Amb. Nash reported briefly on four areas. The
first was President Karzai’s ongoing poppy
eradication program in five key provinces.
The UK had received mixed reports of the
results, and intended to send out teams with
UNODC to evaluate these claims and make an
independent assessment. The second related
area was development support, as international
experience has shown that without strong
development support for at least 3 years, poppy
eradication is not sustainable. President Karzai
was aware of this and had asked the UK and
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others to proceed with the rapid development
of alternative livelihood work. Following on
from this, a major success has recently been
achieved with the assistance of donors/
UNAMA/UNODC in that new funding for this
area has been found ($10-20 million) as well
as the reprioritization of existing government
programs.
• Amb. Nash then talked through a diagram which
set out the CN law enforcement structures of
the state. This work would become the basis of
a government decree. It was important to note
that the NSC would have no law enforcement
operational role, but rather an overarching
and strategic coordination function. The final
point he covered concerned wider international
involvement in the CN work. The intention was
to convene a meeting in the near future to discuss
wider CN involvement to include all interested
parties. The Chinese, the Iranians, and possibly
the Russians would also wish to attend such
a gathering. As a footnote, the Ambassador
added that the core group addressing CN issues
consisted of CND, UNODC, INL, UK, and
German Police Project.
Security and Rule of Law Consultative Groups
Amb. Taylor reiterated that the purpose of the
consultative group structure was threefold, to put
Afghan ministers in charge, to help coordinate assistance within a sector, and to assist with the preparation
of a budget. The consultative group mechanism was
designed to assist ministers to pull together donors in
a coordinated fashion. The budget was currently being
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prepared and was due to be presented on 17 March
at the donor’s conference, possibly in Brussels. There
would be a premeeting in Kabul the week before at
which Ministers would present their plans for initial
scrutiny. This process puts the GoA in charge and links
in with earlier points made about Afghan ownership
by Mr. Brahimi. Amb. Taylor urged SSR group
participants to use the CG structure for these purposes
and to call the first meetings in the near future.
Strategies for Afghan Involvement in SSR
• MG Eikenberry expressed the view that Afghan
involvement in the SSR process remained an
important challenge to be resolved, as stated
earlier in the meeting. Bringing the relevant
Afghan SSR leaders together was crucial to
educating them about the interdependence of
SSR issues and forcing them to address these
matters in a collective fashion. The matter was
not assisted by frequent overseas travel by
Afghan leaders, which now had to be curtailed
as it represented a brake on progress. Once the
leader had left, the lack of an effective Deputy
meant that nothing could be taken forward. Mr.
Brahimi agreed with this point and pleaded
with lead nations to stop extending so many
invites to Afghan leaders, and to instead hold
conferences in Kabul rather than their own
capitals. MG Eikenberry suggested that there
were two possible routes to achieve progress
with respect to broader SSR dialogue with the
Karzai Administration. One was the higher
level approach to the President through the
offices of Mr. Brahimi together with lead nation
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Ambassadors; another was use of an organization like the NSC to join with an expanded group
to include the lead nation reps and then report
back to the President. Amb. Nash commented
that he had examined the latter option and
believed that it was potentially too complex
to orchestrate. A better solution might be for
Dr. Rassoul to attend this meeting and then
report back to the President. Amb. Nash felt
that the NSC had to be involved in the process
somehow. This option was discussed and the
final outcome was that Dr. Rassoul would be
invited to the next meeting, but that he would
not be a regular attendee. This would be done
on a trial basis, as part of what Mr. Brahimi had
described as an “ad hoc” approach to Afghan
engagement in SSR.
• In closing the meeting, MG Eikenberry suggested that it might be worth setting up a
meeting with the President, the five lead nation
Ambassadors, and Mr. Brahimi in order to
discuss the need to keep leaders in Afghanistan
at this sensitive and important time for the
development of SSR. Mr. Brahimi agreed.
Lead Nation Reviews of Policy and Information Theme
Papers:
There was no time to cover this item.
Date of Next Meeting: German Ambassador offered to
host the next meeting on 12 March 2003, 10am-12pm,
German Embassy Conference Room. The tentative
agenda is as follows:
• Tokyo DDR Conference Readout (Japan).
• Defense Commission Sub-Commission Updates
(UNAMA, Japan, and U.S.).
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• Preparation for President’s 21 March Address
on DDR Implementation (UNAMA and Japan).
• Norwegian Border Police Decision and Outcome
of Structures Working Group (Norway, U.S.,
and Germany).
• Master Plan & Unified Framework Update
(Italy)
• ADF Conference and SSR Related Issues (U.S. Amb. Taylor)
• MoI Structures & Police Decree Update and
Plans for Expansion into Provinces (Germany)
• Briefing on U.S. INL Police Training and
Communications/ID Card Scheme (U.S.).
• Discussion of Policy and Information Theme
Papers (UNAMA and Lead Nations, with each
Lead Nation focusing on its particular security
sector area. Suggested format and example [U.S.
paper submitted at 26 Jan 2003 SSR meeting]
attached below.
*NOTE: Dr. Zalmay Rassoul, National Security
Advisor, will be invited to attend this meeting.
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